Resolving the Problem of Undocumented Workers in American Society:  A Model Guest Worker Statute by Powell, Marjorie E.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 17
1984 
Resolving the Problem of Undocumented Workers in American 
Society: A Model Guest Worker Statute 
Marjorie E. Powell 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Immigration Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Legislation 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Marjorie E. Powell, Resolving the Problem of Undocumented Workers in American Society: A Model Guest 
Worker Statute, 17 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 297 (1984). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol17/iss2/9 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF 
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 
AMERICAN SOCIETY: A MODEL 
GUEST WORKER STATUTE 
The presence of large numbers of illegal aliens working in the United 
States has created several problems. Illegal aliens symbolize the inability 
of the United States to control its borders and care for its citizens. 
Their illegal presence indicates a willingness to violate United States 
laws. Apart from these symbolic problems, illegal aliens may create 
economic harms. Their fear of apprehension and deportation makes 
them susceptible to exploitation by employers, leading to lessened en-
forcement of United States wage, health, and safety legislation, as well 
as to depressed wages and working conditions. The presence of illegal 
aliens also increases population pressures on natural resources. 
Several solutions have been proposed to the problem of the presence 
of large numbers of illegal aliens. 1 A program for admission of tem-
porary workers provides one potential solution. Although there are 
several proposals for modification of the existing temporary worker 
program, and for creation of a new, larger temporary worker program, 2 
these proposals have not met with universal approval. Some groups, 
for example, have called for the revision or elimination of the existing 
program, 3 arguing that the presence of foreign workers depresses wages 
and working conditions for all workers. 
l. For example, the Simpson-Mazzoli bill includes as solutions employer sanctions for the 
hiring of illegal aliens, stricter border control, and amnesty for illegal aliens in the United States. 
For descriptions of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, see The Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1983, 129 CoNG. REC. S6969 (May 18, 1983); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
97TH CONG., 2D SEss., IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL 7 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter 
cited as SENATE STAFF REPORT); Simpson, The Immigration Reform and Control Act: Immigra-
tion Policy and the National Interest, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 147, 159 (1984); Note, The Simpson-
' Mazzoli Bill: Altering the Policy of Neglect of Undocumented Immigration from South of the 
Border, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 347 (1983). Other proposed alternatives include forced repatriation, 
open immigration, and development aid aimed at increasing job opportunities in rural regions 
of sending countries. 
2. SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note l, at 19-20 (briefly reviewing recent administrations' 
immigration reform proposals); see also H.R. 3961, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (proposing tem-
porary worker program); H.R. 2984, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (removing adverse wage deter-
mination as requirement for admission of temporary agricultural workers); H.R. 4795, 97th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1981) (proposing Agricultural Guest Worker Act of 1981); H.R. 4021, 97th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1981) (proposing temporary worker program). 
3. Migrant Legal Action Program, The "H-2 Program": Temporary Alien Workers in the 
U.S. Agriculture, in SELECT CoMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, STAFF REPORT, 
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This Note argues that a temporary foreign worker program is needed 
to alleviate the effects of illegal immigration. Part I describes the pro-
blems that illegal aliens present and discusses the interests of the groups 
affected by their presence in the United States. Part II discusses the 
inability of forced repatriation, amnesty, closing the border, or employer 
sanctions to satisfy these interests. Part II also discusses the undesirabili-
ty of ignoring the problem of illegal aliens. Part III explains how a 
program for admission of temporary foreign workers best meets the 
interests of domestic employers, domestic and foreign workers, send-
ing countries, and the United States as a society. Finally Part IV pro-
poses a model statute for a temporary foreign worker program. 
I. ILLEGAL ALIEN WORKERS: PROBLEMS AND COMPETING INTERESTS 
A. Problems Created by the Presence of Illegal Aliens 
Although it is impossible to determine exactly how many illegal aliens 
are currently in the United States, 4 estimates range from two to twelve 
million, 5 with general agreement that the actual figure falls between 
four and six million. 6 Estimates of new entrants each year range from 
100,000 to 1,200,000, with general agreement on approximately 600,000.' 
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, app. F, at 17 (1981) [hereinafter cited 
as STAFF REPORT]. 
4. Several problems exist with the various estimation methods. Corwin, The Numbers Game: 
Estimates of Illegal Aliens in the United States, 1970-198/, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoss., Spring 
1982, at 223 (describing problems with data on which estimates are based and assumptions underly-
ing estimating methods; discussing political reasons for favoring higher or lower estimates); Sehgal 
& Vialet, Documenting the Undocumented: Data, Like Aliens, are Elusive, MONTHLY LAB. REV., 
Oct. 1980, at 18 (summarizing varying estimates resulting from six recent studies); Siegel, Passel 
& Robinson, Preliminary Review of Existing Studies of the Number of Illegal Alien Residents 
in the United States, in STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, app. E, at 15 (distinguishing speculative 
and empirically based estimation methods and assessing accuracy of the empirically based methods); 
see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ILLEGAL AuENs: ANALYSIS AND BACKGROUND 3 
(prepared for the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.) (Comm. Print 1977) 
(noting that the variation in Immigration and Naturalization Service estimates between 1 and 
12 million "cast[s] some doubt on their credibility"). 
5. S. WEINTRAUB & S. Ross, THE ILLEGAL ALIEN FROM MEXICO: POLICY CHOICES FOR AN IN-
TRACTABLE IssuE 12 (1980) (reporting estimates ranging ·from 2 to 12 million, or between 2 and 
3 percent of the total United States population); Chapman, A Look at Illegal Immigration: Causes 
and Impact on the United States, 13 SAN DIEoo L. REv. 34, 35 (1975) (reporting estimates from 
4 to 12 million). 
6. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION POLICY 385 (Staff Report 1979) [hereinafter 
cited as INTERAGENCY TASK FoRcE]; Reubens, Immigration Problems, Limited- Visa Programs 
and Other Options, in STAFF REPORT supra note 3, app. F, at 93; Siegel, Passel & Robinson, 
supra note 4, at 33. 
7. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 255 (noting that estimates of yearly entries 
range from 250,000 to 1,000,000). Most observers agree that 100,000 to 500,000 new illegal aliens 
remain in the United States each year. Martin, Regulating Alien Behavior in Industrial Societies, 
in STAFF REPORT supra note 3, app. F, at 224. 
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Most of these individuals become part of the work force, 8 but many 
return home when no longer employed. 9 
The presence of these large numbers of illegal aliens creates a variety 
of problems. Symbolically, illegal immigration signals failure of the 
government - as planners and enforcers - on a large scale. Such 
a large population of illegal aliens suggests that the United States has 
lost control of its borders. 10 It also signifies the vitiation of the United 
States immigration policy. 11 The existence of a large group that enters 
and exists outside the law reduces respect for the law. 12 Finally, popula-
8. Reubens, supra note. 6, at 135 (reporting that eighty percent of illegal aliens work); see 
also INTERAGENCY-TASK FoRCE, supra note 6, at 148; Fogel, Illegal Aliens: Economic Aspects 
and Public Policy Alternatives, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 63, 67 (1979); North & LaBel, Manpower 
and Immigration Policies in the United States (National Commission for Manpower Policy Special 
Report No. 20, 1978). 
9. Workers have traditionally moved across the land now marked as the border between the 
United States and Mexico. See Fogel, supra note 8, at 74-75; Scruggs, The US, Mexico, and 
the Wetbacks, 1942-1947, reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON lHE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., 
SELECTED READINGS ON U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND LAW 238, 239 (Comm. Print 1980). Many 
Mexican families rely on income earned from work in the United States. Lopez, Undocumented 
Mexican Immigration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 
615, 685 (1981); Siegel, Passel & Robinson, supra note 4, at 28-29 (finding that three quarters 
of the families in one village relied on United States earnings and two-thirds of these alien workers 
were legal immigrants). Many illegal aliens intend to work only temporarily in the United States. 
W. CORNELIUS, L. CHAVEZ & J. CASTRO, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: A 
SUMMARY OF CuRRENT KNOWLEDGE 14-15 (1982); Bustamente & Martinez, Undocumented Im-
migration from Mexico: Beyond Borders but within Systems, 33 J. INT'L AFF. 265, 268 (1979); 
Poitras, The U.S. Experience of Return Migrants from Costa Rica and El Salvador, in STAFF 
REPORT, supra note 3, app. E, at 45, 89. Immigration and Naturalization Service enforcement 
policies and ineligibility of illegal aliens for United States social service programs encourage Mexican 
illegal aliens to return to Mexico when they are not employed. Martin, supra note 7, at 232 
(possibility of apprehension encourages return in times of high United States unemployment); 
see also North & LaBel, supra note 8. 
10. The United States does not exercise its sovereign power of control of its borders when 
it allows illegal entry. See Fallows, Immigration: How it's Affecting Us, An. MONTHLY, Nov. 
1983, at 45, 48; Fogel, supra note 8, at 76. Foreign countries, taking advantage of this weakness, 
may send their undesirable members to the United States. A recent example is Cuba's shipment 
of prisoners and mental hospital patients to the United States in the 1980 Mariel Harbor boat-
lift. See, e.g., Orlow, America's Incoherent Immigration Policy: Some Problems and Solutions, 
36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 931, 933 n.10 (1982). 
11. The illegal entry of aliens defeats policy decisions about the allocation of visas to each 
country, Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)§ 202(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1982), the types 
of persons to be excluded, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 41, 60;-INA _§ 212, 8 
U.S.C. § 1182, and the primacy of family reunification, Chiswick, Guidelines for the Reform 
of Immigration Policy, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 893, 901-02 (1982); INA§§ 201(b), 203(a)(I), (2), 
(3), (5), 8 U.S.C. §§ 115I(b), 1153(a)(I), (2), (3), (5); see also Goodpaster, I/legal Immigration, 
1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 651,653 (1981) (noting that citizens, through the political process, or illegal 
aliens can define the types of persons currently entering the United States and therefore the 
future composition of the United States society). 
12. See Lopez, supra note 9, at 707 (reporting loss of respect by Mexicans for United States 
laws). One major violation, smuggling of aliens into the United States, constitutes a major prob-
lem for law enforcement agencies, and a danger to many aliens. See also Goodpaster, supra 
note II, at 68 I. 
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tion planning and resource allocation cannot occur when there is a 
large but unidentifiable group of people in the United States. 13 
In the short term, significant economic effects of illegal immigra-
tion must be considered. Although the effects of illegal immigration 
cannot be proven conclusively, there are claims that these effects are 
large and undesirable. Illegal aliens may impose burdens on United 
States income transfer programs. 14 · More significantly, widespread 
13. Regardless of the role the United States should play as a sovereign or as a haven for 
disadvantaged people, the immigration policy must show some concern about the number of 
people in the country. Population growth from legal and iilegal immigration imposes pressures 
on natural resources and disparity in living conditions, leading to poverty and cultural conflict. 
Goodpaster, supra note II, at 653; Comment, Employer Sanctions: The "New Solution" to 
the Illegal Alien Problem, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 439. 
14. Because illegal aliens are, by definition, outside the law, there is limited information from 
which to draw conclusions on their use of, and contribution to, social services. Although it ap-
pears aliens are not responsible for large drains on social services, some aliens do receive services 
to which they are not entitled or indirectly cause others to need such services. For some aliens, 
the opposite problem occurs; they contribute to government coffers but are afraid to use the services. 
Some scholars have found that illegal aliens directly and indirectly burden social service pro-
grams. Some studies report that illegal aliens impose costs greater than their contributions to 
social service and income transfer programs. See, e.g., Chapman, A Look at Illegal Immigra-
tion: Causes and Impact on the United States, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 34, 35 (1975); Manulkin 
& Maghame, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Undocumented Mexican Alien Workers, 
13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42, 48 (1975). In addition, illegal aliens impose an indirect burden on 
income transfer programs; domestic workers unemployed due to competition from illegal aliens 
turn to income transfer programs. Lopez describes this belief as part of the "informed consen-
sus" about illegal aliens, a consensus based on an inaccurate understanding of historical events 
and present circumstances. Lopez, supra note 9, at 635. 
Other researchers say these conclusions are incorrect. Illegal aliens are not eligible for most 
social service and income transfer programs, including Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), Social Security Supplemental Income for the Aged, Blind and Disabled (SSI), Food 
Stamps, Medicaid and Unemployment Insurance. D. NORTH, ENFORCING THE IMMIGRATION LAw: 
A REVIEW OF THE OPTIONS 73 (1980) [hereinafter cited as D. NORTH, REVIEW OF OPTIONS); Good-
paster, supra note 11, at 696. Legal obstacles and the fear of being caught and deported have 
discouraged illegal aliens from trying to collect money from income transfer programs. For ex-
ample, estimates of illegal aliens who have collected unemployment compensation range from 
207o to 10% of illegal aliens. D. NORTH, IMMIGRATION AND INCOME TRANSFER POLICIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF A NoN-RELATIONSIIlP 37-38 (1980); Lopez, supra note 9, at 636. 
Even when aliens contribute to social programs, they are unlikely to benefit. At least 55% 
of illegal aliens have social security payments deducted from their wages, according to a sum-
mary of five studies. D. NORTH, supra, at 27. Illegal aliens contribute tax revenue through sales taxes 
and property taxes through rent payments. Lopez, supra note 9, at 363. Still, few illegal aliens 
receive benefits from their contributions. Social security payments to retirees in Mexico are lower 
than payments to retirees in other countries. D. NORTH, THE BORDER CROSSERS; PEOPLE WHO 
LIVE IN MEXICO AND WORK IN THE UNITED STATES (1970), reprinted in Migrant and Seasonal 
Farmworker Powerlessness: Hearings on Border Commuter Labor Problem Before the Subcomm. 
on Migratory Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., !st Sess. 
2194, 2395-96 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NORTH, BORDER CROSSERS). Illegal aliens make limited 
use of medical care and job training programs. North & Houstoun, The Characteristics and 
Role of Illegal Aliens in the U.S. Labor Market: An Exploratory Study, summarized in STAFF 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 226; see also COMMUNITY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, UNDOCUMENTED IM-
MIGRANTS: THEIR IMPACT ON THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO (1980); D. NORTH, GOVERNMENT RECORDS: 
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employment-oriented illegal immigration threatens exploitation by 
employers. 15 A continuing debate addresses the effect of illegal aliens 
upon the economy. Many analysts believe that alien labor "replaces" 
American labor in two ways. First, undocumented workers replace 
domestic workers directly. Because employers can pay lower wages or 
withhold contributions to social security and unemployment compen-
sation, they may prefer to hire undocumented workers. 16 Second, there 
may be an indirect, and perhaps more widespread, replacement effect. 
This indirect replacement occurs because the presence of illegal aliens 
retards improvements in wages and working conditions that would at-
tract domestic workers. 11 Some experts disagree with the notion of a 
WHAT THEY TELL Us ABOUT THE ROLE OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS IN THE LABOR MARKET AND IN 
INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS (1981). 
On balance, their contributions to such systems may outweigh costs that they impose on social 
service and income transfer programs. STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 526; S. WEINTRAUB & 
S. Ross, supra note 5, at 24-25. 
15. Employers often exploit illegal workers by intentionally refusing to abide by protective 
legislation. Chapman, supra note 5, at 40; Developments in the Law - Immigration Policy and 
the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1437 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Developments). 
Illegal aliens fear deportation, see, e.g., INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 390, 395; 
Hiller, Immigration Policies of the Reagan Administration, 44 V. PITT. L. REV. 495, 502 (1983), 
and this fear renders them susceptible to exploitation because they have limited power to object 
to unlawful working conditions. Ortega, Plight of the Mexican Wetback, 58 A.B.A. J. 251 (1972), 
reprinted in MEXICAN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES: HtsTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 
187, 189-90 (G. Kiser & M. Kiser eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as MEXICAN WORKERS); LOPEZ, 
supra note 9, at 629. For example, North and Houstoun found that 240Jo of the illegal aliens 
they interviewed received less than the minimum wage. North & Houstoun, supra note 14, at 
224. Flagrant violations of protective legislation lead to disrespect, by illegal aliens and legal 
residents, for all laws. "Wholesale evasion of the law must inevitably breed contempt for the 
law." s. WEINTRAUB & s. Ross, supra note 5, at 5; see also, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, supra 
note 6, at 399; Lopez, supra note 9, at 629, 707. 
This exploitation, apart from its impact on American workers, harms aliens who work in jobs 
violating legislative definitions of fair wages and safe conditions. Minimum wage, health, and 
safety legislation applies to all workers regardless of legal status in the United States. Briefing 
Paper, Protective Labor Laws and Illegal Migrants, in STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, app. E, 
at 239. As a policy decision, the United States should protect the welfare of the entire work 
force. North & Houstoun, supra note 14, at 231. 
16. The one-to-one displacement theory holds that illegal aliens directly replace domestic workers 
by working harder and accepting lower wages and working conditions. Lopez, supra note 9, 
at 631-33. Illegal aliens who overstay their visas - better educated and more skilled than illegal 
border crossers - more often replace domestic workers. Chapman, supra note 5, at 37-39. 
Still, some authors cite studies casting doubt on the existence of this displacement effect. S. 
WEINTRAUB & s. Ross, supra note 5, at 18; W. CORNELIUS, L. CHAVEZ & J. CASTRO, supra note 9 . 
. 17. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 274; Fogel, supra note 8, at 70-71. 
Proponents of this position cite economic evidence that the Bracero program (temporary farm 
worker program operated from 1942 to 1965 under various bilateral agreements with Mexico)· 
restrained wage increases and caused unemployment among domestic farm workers. For descrip-
tions of the Bracero program, see DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRA-
TION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, STUDY OF POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION PROBLEMS 23-26 
(prepared for the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.) (Comm. Print 1963); 
Scruggs, Texas and the Bracero Program, in MEXICAN WORKERS, supra note 15, at 85. For a 
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replacement effect and explain that illegal aliens fill jobs that domestic 
workers have already abandoned, thereby enabling marginal enterprises 
to exist and creating still more jobs. 18 
These issues have led to several proposals responding to the presence 
of large numbers of illegal aliens. 19 The interests of the several con-
cerned groups must be considered in evaluating these proposals. 
B. Competing Interests 
Several groups have interests in solving the problems posed by il-
legal aliens in the United States: (1) the United States society as a whole; 
(2) employers; (3) illegal alien workers; (4) legal United States resident 
workers; and (5) sending countries. 
1. United States society- The United States has several societal 
interests in the resolution of the problem of illegal alien workers. These 
discussion of its impact on farm workers' wages, see Briggs, Foreign Labor Programs as an 
Alternative to Illegal Immigration into the United States: A Dissenting View, in STAFF REPORT, 
supra note 3, app. F, at 141. 
This view assumes that United States businesses now employing illegal aliens would respond 
to the decrease in available workers by upgrading wages and working conditions to attract domestic 
workers, see Note, supra note I, at 360-61, or by converting to less labor-intensive operations, 
Fogel, supra note 4, at 72; Reubens, supra note 6, at 107. Both alternatives assume enterprises 
sufficiently profitable to justify increased wages or capital investments. See Fogel, supra note 
8, at 72; Reubens, supra note 6, at I 07. It has been argued, however, that marginal enterprises 
will not survive the added costs of higher wages or capital investments. Note, supra note I. 
Rigid wage systems may require increases for several job categories if employers raise the lowest 
wages to attract domestic workers, creating costs greater than the employer can cover. Martin 
& Houstoun, The Future of International Labor Migration, 33 J. INT'L AFF. 311, 325-26 (1979). 
Some marginal enterprises will close, resulting in a loss of jobs filled by legal and illegal workers. 
Reubens, supra note 6, at 103. Galbraith reports that many European businesses would close 
without foreign workers. J. GALBRAITII, THE NATURE OF MASS POVERTY 129-30 (1979). Fogel, 
however, argues that closings will occur less often than employers intimate. Fogel, supra note 
8, at 72. 
Alternatively, enterprises may move to areas of lower labor costs. Morgan & Gardner, Poten-
tial for a U.S. Guest-Worker Program in Agriculture: Lessons from the Braceros, in THE GATEWAY: 
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION ISSUES AND POLICIES 361, 407 (8. Chiswick ed. 1982). The increase 
in the number of companies operating across the Mexican border illustrates the flow of enter-
prises away from more costly labor markets. Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, A Phased-Out Guest 
Worker Proposal, in STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, app. F, at 343, 358. 
18. See E. THOMAS, IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN WESTERN EUROPE: THEIR LEGAL STATUS 218 
(1982); Fogel, supra note 8, at 71; Reubens, supra note 6, at 103-04. Further, higher wages alone 
might not attract domestic workers. S. WEINTRAUB & S. Ross, supra note 5, at 103. 
19. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE supra note 6, at 79 (describing a proposed temporary worker 
program); SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note I (proposing temporary status with an opportunity 
to adjust to permanent resident alien); Briggs, supra note 17, at 154 (describing proposed tem-
porary worker programs); Cook, Amnesty/Temporary Worker Plan, in STAFF REPORT, supra 
note 3, app. F, at 338 (proposing temporary worker status); Lansing & Alabart, The Reagan 
Administration Proposals on Immigration: The Problem of the Undocumented Alien in the United 
States, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. I (1983) (describing proposal for renewable term temporary residence); 
Reubens, supra note 6, at 119 (recommending a temporary worker program). 
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include maintenance of economic health20 and enforcement of laws. 21 
The United States also has an interest in maintaining good relations 
with countries sending large numbers of illegal aliens, 22 and that in-
terest may influence the viability of any response to the large number 
of illegal aliens. 
2. Employers- Employers of illegal aliens have an interest in the 
continued presence of workers willing to accept jobs. 23 This interest 
coincides with society's interest in the continued survival of enterprises 
employing domestic and illegal alien workers. If aliens are taking jobs 
no one else will take, or taking jobs at lower wages, they aid the pro-
fitability of the employer. If employers seek to exploit illegal aliens, 
however, their interest conflicts with society's interest in enforcement 
of worker protection legislation. 
3. Aliens working in the United States- Alien workers have an 
interest in entering the United States. For some, the interest lies in 
the opportunity to immigrate. Unfortunately, not all who wish to live 
20. To the extent that illegal aliens displace domestic workers, income transfer payments 
rise. See supra note 19. On the other hand, if employers raise wages and increase capital in-
vestments and then raise prices, consumers suffer. If marginal enterprises close or relocate to 
other countries, domestic workers in those enterprises and the economy suffer. 
An adequate supply of workers serves as another indicator of economic health. Gregory, A 
Mexican Temporary Workers Program: The Search for Codetermination, in STAFF REPORT, supra 
note 3, app. F, at 281,288 (concluding that unskilled jobs not replaced by automation will re-
main unfilled); Reubens, supra note 6, at 104 (predicting a shortage of unskilled and semiskilled 
workers); Whelan, Principles of U.S. Immigration Policy, 44 U. Prrr L. REv. 447, 475 (1983) 
(noting an aging population and a shortage of unskilled workers). 
21. The United States interests require enforcement of the immigration laws. See·Fuchs, Direc-
tions for U.S. Immigration Policy: Immigration Policy and the Rule of Law, 44 U. PITT. L. 
REv. 433, 440 (1983). United States interests also require enforcement of worker protection laws. 
Such laws apply to all workers. See supra note 15. Illegal aliens threaten protective standards 
because employers can violate the laws without fear that aliens will complain. See supra note 
15. Maintenance of standards requires increased enforcement. Fogel, supra note 8, at 66. For 
a general discussion of protective labor laws, see Notre Dame University Law School, Employer 
Sanctions: Research Study, in STA_FF REPORT, supra note 3, app. E, at 568, 572 [hereinafter 
cited as Notre Dame Project]. 
22. See Developments, supra note 15, at 1459 & n.132 (noting the need to meet the interests 
of sending countries sufficiently to secure their cooperation in preventing illegal entry into the 
United States). The impact of foreign relations on immigration policy is clearly presented in 
United States relations with Mexico. An estimated 600Jo of the illegal aliens in the United States 
are Mexicans. Id. at 1436 & n.13. The 2000 mile United States border with Mexico has an in-
terdependent economy. See NORTH, BORDER CROSSERS, supra not~ 14, at 2194, 2213. Workers 
have historically moved freely across the border. See Goodpaster, supra note 11, at 667, and 
United States employers have historically recruited workers in Mexico. See Bustamante & Mar-
tinez, supra note 9, at 266. The federal government implicitly participates in entry by frequent 
relaxation of border enforcement, see Cardenas, U.S. Immigration Policy Toward Mexico: An 
Historical Perspective, 2 CHICANO L. REv. 66, 91 (1975), and by relatively small resource alloca-
tions to enforcement, see Chiswick, supra note 11. 
23. See supra notes 16-18. 
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permanently in the United States will have the opportunity to do so. 2 ' 
For other aliens, the interest in entering the United States is an interest 
in temporary work. Historically, many immigrants intend to return to 
their home country in a position to enjoy a better life. 25 Nevertheless, 
United States immigration law and policy, with the exception of the 
limited H -2 program, 26 only provides immigration for permanent 
residence. 
Undocumented workers in this country have an interest in 
acknowledgement of their basic human rights, 21 the consistent applica-
tion of protective legislation, a clear statement of their rights to social 
services and income transfer programs. In addition, many illegal aliens 
working in the United States have contributed to the economy. They 
deserve recognition for this contribution. 28 They also deserve a clear 
determination of their responsibility for tax payments. 
24. No more than 20,000 visas issue to natives of an individual country each year. INA § 
202(a), 8 U .S.C. § ll 52(a) (1982). Within this ceiling, visa allocations occur within preference 
categories. Four of seven preference categories consist of family members of citizens and perma-
nent resident aliens. INA §§ 202(b), 203(a)(l), (2), (4), (5), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b), ll53(a)(I), 
(2), (4), (5). One preference category covers members of professions or workers with exceptional 
ability. INA§ 203(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § I 153(a)(3). One category covers workers "performing specified 
skilled or unskilled labor . . . for which a shortage of employable and willing persons exists 
in the United States." INA § 203(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(6). A seventh category includes all 
persons not within the first six categories. Visas in this seventh category were last available in 
1978. Chiswick, supra note 11, at 950; Developments, supra note 15, at 1337. 
25. w. CORNELIUS, L. CHAVEZ & J. CASTRO, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS AND SournERN CALIFOR-
NIA: A SUMMARY OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE 57-58 (1982); Campo, Spain, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR 
MIGRATION IN EUROPE 156, 158 (R. Krane ed. 1979) (saving to buy an apartment or tools to. 
work independently for Spanish workers); Kessner, Repatriation in American History, in STAFF 
REPORT, supra note 3, app. A, at 287; THOMAS, The Migratory_Phenomenon and Returning 
Migrants in Turkey (A Case Study), in IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN EUROPE: THEIR LEGAL STATUS 
4 (Thomas ed. 1982) (saving to start business or buy farm for Turkish workers migrating to Europe). 
European guest workers initially intend to go home. Reimann & Reimann, Federal Republic 
of Germany, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION IN EUROPE, supra, at 63, 69; Hoffman-Nowotny 
& Killias, Switzerland, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION IN EUROPE, supra, at 45, 60-61. 
Several factors pressure aliens to remain in the host country: adjustment to the rewards of an 
industrial society, formation or immigration of families, inadequate savings to achieve goals upon 
return to the home country, scarcity of jobs in the sending country, and continuing availability 
of jobs in the host country. Martin & Houstoun, supra note 17, at 327. European countries, 
recognizing the dependence of their econoinic structure on the presence of alien workers, have 
moved to encourage alien workers to remain. Rist, The European Economic Community (EEC) 
and Manpower Migrations: Policies and Prospects, 33 J. INT'L AFF. 201, 215 (1979). 
26. Named for the authorizing section, INA§ 10l(a)(l5)(H)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(l5)(H)(ii) 
(1982). For a description see infra notes 69-83 and accompanying text. 
27. Ortega, supra note 15, at 195 (advocating the need to recognize basic human rights of 
illegal aliens); Lopez, supra note 9, at 695. For a discussion of the rights accorded aliens in 
Europe, see E. THOMAS, IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN EUROPE: THEIR LEGAL STATUS 244 (1982); Chaney, 
Migrant Workers and National Boundaries: The Basis for Rights and Protections, in BOUNDARIES: 
NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMITS 54-58 (Brown & Shue eds. 1981). 
28. Imported workers remove labor bottlenecks, allow capital investment by their willingness 
to work second and third shifts, delay wage increases, allow domestic workers to move to more 
skilled jobs, make fewer demands for social services and move into and out of jobs, increasing 
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4. Citizens and resident aliens working in the United States- Resi-
dent workers, both citizens and permanent resident aliens, have an in-
terest in the protection of their jobs, wages, and working conditions. 
This interest is defeated when illegal aliens displace domestic workers 
in available jobs but is supported when the presence of additional 
workers enables employers to continue employing domestic workers. 
Domestic workers also benefit, as do citizens, from lower prices for 
goods and services that result from continued operation of marginal 
enterprises. If such enterprises close, decreased supply would lead to 
higher prices. Likewise, increased wages would lead to higher prices. 
5. Sending countries- Sending countries have an interest in the 
protection of their citizens from exploitation while living and working 
in the United States29 and in the continued availability of United States 
work for their citizens. Immigration and temporary work serve as safety 
valves for countries with high rates of unemployment and underemploy-
ment, easing the social and political tensions that limited job oppor-
tunites create. 30 Remittances sent by workers in the United States aid 
the economies of sending countries. 31 
Any successful solution to the problem of the presence of large 
numbers of illegal alien workers in the United States must consider 
all of these competing and overlapping interests. 32 Each proposed solu-
the flexibility of the economy. Power, The Great Debate on Illegal Immigration - Europe and 
the USA Compared, 33 J. INT'L AFF. 239, 241 (1979); Developments, supra note 15, at 1453 
(arguing that in a participation model of immigration, rights correlate with social and economic 
involvement in society). 
29. For one expression of this concern, see Echeverria, Mexico's Recent Position on Workers 
for the United States, in MEXICAN WORKERS, supra note 15, at 124. 
30. See S. WEINTRAUB & S. Ross, supra note 5; Reubens, supra note 6, at 124. 
Sending countries also benefit from eventual return of workers trained in the host country, 
according to one theory. Rist, supra note 25, at 202. This benefit may be offset if the workers 
do not return to their country of origin, . Bustamante & Martinez, supra note 9, at 282, or if 
the host country requires more and more new workers, Rist, supra note 25, at 204; Widgren, 
Sweden, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIORATION IN EuROPE 19, 40 (R. Krane ed. 1979). Some labor 
exporting countries now also import labor. See J. POWER, WESTERN EUROPE'S MIGRANT WORKERS 
23 (Minority Rights Oroup Report No. 28, 1979). 
31. S. WEINTRAUB & S. Ross, supra note S, at S (identifying remittances as foreign aid to 
sending country); Lansing & Alabart, supra note 19, at 34 (reporting that remittances to Mexico 
total between I.Sand 3 billion U.S. dollars yearly). Remittances, however, have negative effects. 
E. THOMAS, IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN EUROPE: THEIR LE0AL STATUS 4 (1982) (noting that remit-
tances purchase consumer goods, often goods manufactured in the host rather than the sending 
country); Martin & Houstoun, supra note 17, at 329 (identifying the increased demand for con-
sumer goods as a factor in wage increases, inflation, a shift to capital-intensive production methods, 
and fewer industrial jobs; rising land costs; decreased numbers of workers available for the local 
work force; urbanization and a decrease in agricultural production); Poitras, supra note 9, at 
161 (acknowledging that remittances support the host country economy because aliens and their 
families purchase United States consumer goods). 
32. Developments, supra note 15, at 14S8. 
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tion to the presence of illegal aliens must be reviewed in terms of these 
competing interests. 
II. ALTERNATIVES TO A TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM 
Immigration analysts have proposed many solutions to the problems 
of illegal aliens. These include forced repatriation, legalization of status, 
closure of United States borders against future entries of undocumented 
aliens, employer sanctions, and several other programs. 33 Some have 
also advocated simply that the status quo remain intact. Responsible 
participants in the policy dialogue have discussed each of these pro-
posals. Unfortunately, the proponents of these alternatives have failed 
to consider the interests of all of the relevant groups, and this failure 
results in difficulties with each of the proposed alternatives. 
A. Forced Repatriation 
As one alternative, the United States might forcibly repatriate il-
legal aliens. 34 This would involve locating and deporting all aliens 
without legal entry papers or with expired non-immigrant visas. 
Implementing this alternative would incur fiscal, economic, social 
and foreign policy costs. This program would be expensive, due to 
the administrative costs involved in locating illegal aliens scattered 
throughout the United States, conducting deportation hearings in ac-
cordance with due process requirements35 and transporting aliens with 
insufficient money to cover their own travel costs. 36 In addition, forced 
repatriation would strain judicial resources. 37 
33. Other alternatives mentioned but not widely discussed include lowering trade barriers 
to encourage importation of goods from Mexico, and identifying labor intensive production systems 
in agriculture and industry which sending countries can implement. UNITED PREsBYIERIAN CHURCH 
IN THE U.S.A. & PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES, MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE 
UNITED STATES: CHALLENGE TO CHRISTIAN WITNESS AND NATIONAL POLICY 42 (1981). 
34. INS Interior Enforcement Procedures, in STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, app. G, at 69-75 
(describing procedures to locate and deport illegal aliens); Reubens, supra note 6, at 113 (arguing 
that forced repatriation will be difficult and expensive); Note, supra note I, at 363 (arguing 
that administrative costs of forced repatriation are prohibitive). European countries have at-
tempted repatriation programs, including cash payments to induce aliens to return home. The 
programs have had limited success. Bovenkerk, The Netherlands, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRA-
TION IN EUROPE 118, 129-30 (R. Krane ed. 1979); Koelstra & Simon, France, in id. at 142. 
35. See Note, supra note I, at 363-64 & n.124. 
36. The Immigration and Naturalization Service pays costs of deportation to the port of 
entry and, in many circumstances, to the receiving country. See INA§ 243(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(c) 
(1982). 
37. See Gordon, Recent Developments in Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 15 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 9 (1977) (general discussion of judicial review of immigration decisions). Goodpaster, 
supra note II, at 679, describes the limited involvement of district courts in deportation pro-
cedures for illegal aliens apprehended near the Mexican border, and argues that any increased 
involvement would overwhelm those courts. 
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Economically, mass deportation of illegal workers would be disad-
vantageous. Agricultural and industrial enterprises currently dependent 
upon illegal alien labor would incur costs either in raising wages and 
working conditions to attract United States workers or in investing the 
funds necessary to convert to less labor-intensive production methods. 
Other marginal enterprises would fold or move to countries with lower 
labor costs, resulting in loss of jobs currently filled by legal as well 
as illegal alien workers. 
A program of force.d repatriation could only be accomplished at large 
social cost. Procedures for locating and apprehending illegal aliens would 
invade the civil rights of citizens and permanent resident aliens. 38 The 
invasion of civil rights and the forced deportation of large numbers 
of individuals would alter the image of the United States as a humane 
country that welcomes people seeking a better life. 39 
Forced repatriation may affect American foreign relations. Relations 
with countries to which the United States repatriates large numbers 
of illegal aliens would deteriorate. 40 Sending countries would have to 
integrate returning aliens into their economy. They would also have 
to respond to the higher expectations for social services and political 
rights held by returning aliens. 41 
In contrast, forced repatriation does meet some needs of the United 
States society and of the workers of the United States. It would enable 
the United States to enforce immigration and worker protection laws. 
Moreover, workers deprived of jobs filled by illegal aliens would benefit 
38. Note, supra note 1, at 347 n.3, 364 (asserting that massive apprehension would require 
a paramilitary effort which in turn would result in violations of the civil rights of citizens and 
permanent resident aliens). Apprehension of all illegal aliens would require "more troops than 
we sent to Indochina - a patently absurd concept." Badillo, ls Amnesty for Illegal Aliens a 
Sound U.S. Policy? Pro, 56 CONG. DIG. 240, 242 (1977); see also Bernsen, Search and Seizure 
on the Highway for Immigration Violations: A Survey of the Law, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 69 
(1975); Fragomen, Searching for Illegal Aliens: The Immigration Service Encounters the Fourth 
Amendment, 13 SAN DIEoo L. REv. 82 (1975). 
39. United States citizens and citizens of other countries have an image of the United States 
as a humane country which admits immigrants. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 
230; Simpson, supra note 1, at 152. 
40. Koelstra & Simon, France, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION IN EUROPE 133, 142 (R. 
Krane ed. 1979) (observing that Tunisia encountered problems when Libya sent workers home); 
Miller, Reluctant Partnership: Foreign Workers in Franco-Algerian Relations 1962-1979, 33 J. 
INT'L AFF. 219, 234 (1979) (noting that Algeria anticipated problems if France repatriated Algerian 
workers); Reubens, supra note 6, at 123-24 (noting the deteriorating relations with countries to 
which aliens return). Forced repatriation also creates conflicts for other countries to which the 
aliens might seek entry. Studlar, Great Britain, in INTERNATIONAL LABoR MIGRATION IN EuROPE 
88, 92 (R. Krane ed. 1979) (describing expulsion of Commonwealth country citizens from Kenya 
and Uganda; many sought to enter England). 
41. M. MILLER, FOREIGN WORKERS IN WESTERN EUROPE: AN EMERGING POLITICAL FORCE 
(1981) (arguing that guest workers develop increased expectations of living standards and political 
participation). 
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from forced repatriation. Forced repatriation would also eliminate ex-
ploitation of those illegal aliens by United States employers. Finally, 
countries with lower labor costs would benefit from the relocation of 
some United States enterprises. 
Forced repatriation does not, however, meet the needs of other in-
terested groups. It would not allow the United States to share its wealth 
through the purchase of excess labor from developing countries and 
would not meet the employers' needs for workers. Aliens would not 
acquire an opportunity to work temporarily in the United States and 
many aliens would not have a significant opportunity to immigrate. 
Forced repatriation would also result in lost jobs for United States 
workers in marginal enterprises that cannot raise wages or improve 
working conditions sufficiently to attract United States workers. Finally, 
forced repatriation would remove a safety valve from developing coun-
tries with high rates of unemployment and underemployment. 
The effects on internal politics, United States employers, and inter-
national relations suggest that forced repatriation does not provide a 
viable alternative. Most importantly, though, this alternative, at most, 
solves the result of the problem; it does not deal with the cause of 
the illegal alien problem. Forced repatriation removes illegal aliens cur-
rently in the United States, but does not modify the factors that en-
courage aliens to enter or remain in the United States illegally. Those 
factors will result in recurrence of the presence of large numbers of 
illegal aliens. 
B. Amnesty 
Legalizing illegal alien status, usually termed amnesty, presents 
another alternative solution to the presence of large numbers of illegal 
aliens in the United States. 42 This proposal typically involves adjust-
ment of status to that of permanent resident alien for persons who 
can prove a specified length of residence in the United States. 43 Those 
who do not meet the time requirement retain varying alternatives, such 
as participation in a temporary worker program. 44 
Several arguments support granting amnesty to illegal aliens. Legaliza-
tion eliminates a large class of law breakers by converting persons cur-
42. For descriptions of amnesty proposals, see D. NORTH, AMNEsTY, CONFERRING LEGAL STATUS 
ON ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS (1980); Badillo, supra note 38, at 242; Goodpaster, supra note 11, at 
7)1; Note, supra note I, at 363. 
43. The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy report, published in 1981, 
proposed an amnesty for aliens within the United States since 1980. STAFF REPORT, supra note 
3, at 711. Representative Badillo proposed, in 1977, an amnesty date of 1976. Badillo, supra 
note 38, at 242. 
44. See, e.g., Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 348 (recommending an interim 
temporary worker program). 
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rently in the country illegally into legal residents. 45 It solves the prob-
lems that flow from illegal status, such as vulnerability to exploita-
tion. It meets employers' current needs for unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers. Aliens already in the United States retain access to its higher 
wages and acquire the opportunity to remain permanently. Amnesty 
also protects United States workers from competition with workers fear-
ful of deportation. 
There is some question whether an amnesty program would legalize 
the status of a significant number of aliens. Experiences with amnesty 
programs in other countries46 indicate that success depends on the form 
of notification, extent to which organizations traditionally serving aliens 
support the amnesty program, and the extent to which benefits to aliens 
from the amnesty program outweigh harms resulting from continued 
illegal status. Furthermore, amnesty programs work only to the extent 
that potential participants apply for amnesty. Applying, however, in-
volves alerting the government to one's status as an illegal alien. If 
the government subjects aliens who apply - but whom the government 
finds ineligible - to harsh penalties, this will discourage aliens from 
seeking amnesty. 
An amnesty program also suffers from some disadvantages. Amnesty 
limits sharing the United States wealth to those aliens who have been 
present in the country for a specified time period. Other aliens do not 
have the opportunity to earn United States wages or to immigrate for 
permanent settlement, except through the family preference and limited 
worker preference provisions. In addition, persons adjusting to per-
manent resident alien status would acquire the right to admit immediate 
relatives, mushrooming legal immigration. 47 The resulting United States 
population growth imposes pressures on natural resources. 48 Perhaps 
45. Lansing & Alabart, supra note 19, at 26. 
46. D. NORTH, supra note 42 (describing Canadian, British, and Dutch experiences). 
47. Permanent resident aliens' spouses, unmarried sons and unmarried daughters are eligible 
for visas under preference 2. INA§ 2O3(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § I 153(a)(2) (1982). Children (unmarried 
and under 21 years of age), spouses, and parents of citizens enter the United States without 
regard to the numerical admission system. INA § 2Ol(b), 8 U.S.C. § 115l(b). Several of the 
visa preference categories authorize entry of citizens' family members; unmarried sons and 
daughters, INA§ 2O3(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. § l 153(a)(l); married sons and daughters, INA§ 203(a)(4), 
8 U.S.C. § I 153(a)(4); brothers and sisters, INA § 2O3(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § I 153(a)(5). 
In 1982 Congress granted an amnesty to illegal aliens in the Virgin Islands. Concern about 
the negative effects of this potential future immigration in the circumscribed environment of 
the Virgin Islands led to restrictions on the categories of relatives admissible in the future by 
persons adjusting to permanent resident alien status under the terms of the amnesty. Virgin Island 
Nonimmigrant Alien Adjustment Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-271, 96 Stat. 1157; S. REP. No. 
529, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); D. NORTH, THE VIRGIN ISLANDS ALIEN LEGALIZATION PRO-
GRAM: LESSONS FOR THE MAINLAND 13 (1983). 
48. See Goodpaster, supra note 11, at 712 (noting the depletion of natural resources resulting 
from the greater size of the U.S. population); see also SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note I, 
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more importantly, however, general amnesty may encourage future il-
legal immigration. The belief that the United States will respond in 
the future to the presence of illegal aliens with amnesty may encourage 
aliens facing long waits for immigrant visas to enter illegally. 49 
Amnesty, like forced repatriation, may solve the problem of illegal 
aliens currently in the United States, but does not address the factors 
causing the accumulation of large numbers of illegal aliens. 50 Unless 
the government controls the flow of illegal aliens through closer en-
forcement of time limits on the stays for non-immigrants and stricter 
enforcement of immigration laws at the borders and ports of entry, 
the amnesty program will fail to solve the longterm problem of illegal 
aliens. 
C. Border Closure 
Closing the border involves prevention of entry except at immigra-
tion inspection stations. In addition, it requires greater scrutiny of the 
documents of all persons seeking to enter the United States. 
Border closure will meet some of the needs of interested groups. 
Closing the borders would enable the United States to enforce its im-
migration and worker protection laws and would prevent the develop-
ment of a class of workers with limited rights. Border closure would, 
indirectly, protect aliens from exploitation by United States employers, 
and would protect legal workers from competition with illegal aliens. 
Closure of United States borders does, however, entail significant 
disadvantages. The civil rights violations necessary to enforce border 
closure would harm the United States as a society. 51 Also, the United 
States could not redistribute wealth through the purchase of labor from 
less developed countries. Moreover, employers would lose access to 
willing workers, and their responses might result in a reduction of jobs 
at 105 (Statement by Senator East) (arguing that ineligible illegal aliens become eligible for social 
service programs, increasing program costs); Chiswick, supra note 11, at 927 (arguing that with 
permanent resident alien status, seasonal workers who now leave at the conclusion of their work 
period would remain in the United States). 
49. See Abrams, American Immigration Policy: How Strait the Gate?, LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PRoBs., Spring 1982, at 126; Goodpaster, supra note 11, at 712; Murphy, Is Amnesty for Illegal 
Aliens a Sound U.S. Policy? Con, 56 CONG. DIG. 249, 255 (1977). 
50. Jobs draw immigrants. Goodpaster, supra note 11, at 652; Scanlan, Immigration Law 
and the Illusion of Numerical Control, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819, 846 (1982); Note, supra note 
I, at 358. Other factors in sending countries also induce immigration. Krane, INTERNATIONAL 
LABOR MIGRATION IN EUROPE 4 (R. Krane ed. 1979) (citing urbanization and imbalance in regional 
development as factors inducing immigration); Goodpaster, supra note 11, at 665 (arguing that 
reports by returning migrants encourage immigration); Scanlan, supra at 844 (arguing that wage 
disparity and the mobility of populations facilitates immigration); Simpson, supra note I, at 
154 (describing population growth and economic stagnation as influencing immigration). 
51. See Reubens, supra note 6, at 128 (arguing that border closure results in civil rights 
violations). 
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available to legal workers or a rise in prices for goods and services. 
Finally, many aliens would not have the opportunity for temporary 
United States work or permanent immigration, and sending countries 
would lose the safety valve of sending workers to the United States. 
Closing United States borders to all entry would also create ad-
ministrative, social, and foreign relations costs. 52 The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) must bear the significant administrative 
cost of closing the border. Stricter. inspection at ports of entry and 
along the thousands of miles of United States borders with northern 
and southern neighbors would require more INS officers. Changes in 
border patrol methods and perhaps in the open state of the border 
might prove necessary. 53 
A variety of social costs parallel the administrative costs. Citizens 
of the United States may object to the invasion of rights and privacy 
of citizens and permanent resident aliens necessary to the screening 
of all entrants. Actions necessary to close the long stretches of open 
borders, resembling actions by · other governments to prevent their 
citizens from crossing borders, 54 would also raise concerns. Further, 
sending countries might object to treatment of their citizens seeking 
entry to the United States. Finally, other third world countries might 
categorize border closing efforts as a denial of responsibility to share 
United States wealth with less developed countries. 
Many illegal aliens enter the United States on non-immigrant visas 
and remain beyond the time authorized by those visas, requiring en-
forcement of non-immigrant visa time limits to eliminate increases in 
the numbers of illegal aliens. Enforcement of visa time limits would 
require different actions55 from those required to close the borders but 
would create similar burdens. Enforcing visa time limits would also 
meet interests parallel to those met by border closure. 
D. Employer Sanctions 
Proposals for employer sanctions address one of the major pull fac-
tors drawing illegal aliens to the United States, the opportunity to work. 
Although specific proposals vary, 56 all impose a penalty on persons 
52. See D. NORTH, REVIEW OF OPTIONS, supra note 14. 
53. For a description of current border enforcement procedures, see INS Border Enforce-
ment Procedures, supra note 34, at 77. 
54. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 4, at (i(); Comment, supra note 13, 
at 465. 
55. For a description of current internal enforcement procedures, see INS Interior Enforce-
ment Procedures, supra note 34. 
56. For discussions of employer sanctions, see Lansing & Alabart, supra note 19; Loeff, 
Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy Task Force on Work Eligibil-
ity/ Employer Responsibility, in STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, app. E, at 377; Notre Dame Pro-
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employing illegal aliens. 57 Some proposals punish only "knowing" 
employment of illegal aliens. 58 Much of the dispute about employer 
· sanctions focuses on the methods by which employers will verify the 
legal status of job applicants. Alternatives59 include a worker identity 
card60 and a computerized data bank of information about workers. 61 
Proponents argue that employer sanctions would meet the United 
States need to reduce the number of illegal aliens. An employer sanc-
tion program would encourage employers to hire domestic workers by 
increasing the cost of hiring illegal aliens. Aliens, without the pull of 
United States wages, would not enter illegally. This would, necessarily, 
avoid exploitation of aliens by United States employers and would pro-
tect legal workers from competition with illegal aliens. 
Acknowledging that an effective employer sanction program would 
eliminate the incentive for illegal aliens to seek work in the United 
States, opponents of such a program point to associated costs. 
Disseminating information about potential employees may have 
deleterious effects on civil liberties. The potential for government abuse 
of any information system provides a strong reason for extreme cau-
tion in implementing an employer sanctio.n program. 62 The establish-
ment of such a system would also be expensive. Employers would face 
paperwork costs in verifying applicants' status and maintaining records 
of that verification. 63 Members of various ethnic groups may be 
ject, supra note 21; Scanlan, supra note 50, at 842; Work Eligibility Task Force, Enforcement 
of Employer Sanctions for the Employment of Undocumented Aliens; A Working Paper, in 
STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, app. E, at 257. 
57. Murphy, Is Amnesty for Illegal Aliens a Sound U.S. Policy? Con, 56 CONG. DIG. 249, 
253 (1977) (recommending criminal penalties); Notre Dame Project, supra note 21, at 636 (recom-
mending several levels of civil penalties). Allocation of penalties collected to the INS budget 
provides incentive for enforcement, Schweiker, Is Amensty for Illegal Aliens a Sound U.S. Policy? 
Con, 56 CONG. DIG. 235, 241 (1977). 
58. Several proposals provide a statutory defense if the employer proves that he saw ap-
propriate identification. Notre Dame Project, supra note 21, at 613 & 631; Comment, supra 
note 13, at 459. 
59. Scanlan, supra note 50, at 845 (discussing other, admittedly less effective, alternatives). 
60. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 4, at 58; SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra 
note l, at 8-9; Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 345. 
The Social Security Administration objects to the suggested use of social security cards, see 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 4, at 58, and problems exist. See Lansing & Alabart, 
supra note 19, at 22 (noting the potential for civil rights violations); Comment, supra note 13, 
at 463 (describing the potential for forgery). 
61. See D. NORTH, REVIEW OF OPTIONS, supra note 14. Objections include political, prac-
tical, and personal concerns. Notre Dame Project, supra note 21, at 677, 684, 685. 
62. SENATE STAFF REPORT, supra note l, at 9 (noting that limitations imposed on the system 
might prevent abuse); Goodpaster, supra note 11, at 705 (noting past abuse of government record 
keeping and the costs, effort and time necessary to implement an identification system); Recent 
Developments, Immigration Law: Control of Immigration into the United States - Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1982, S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 
410, 414 (1983) (citing concern about a national data bank). 
63. Recent Developments, supra note 62, at 414 (discussing paperwork costs to employers). 
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discriminated against by employers unwilling to risk hiring an illegal 
alien. 64 
Employer sanctions also do not meet the interests of aliens or of 
sending countries. Illegal aliens will lose the -opportunity to work at 
United States wages, even for temporary periods of time as illegal en-
. trants. Employer sanctions will also eliminate the ability of sending 
countries to alleviate their problems of unemployment and 
underemployment. 
Opponents of employer sanctions also raise issues concerning 
enforcement. 65 Countries with employer sanctions have not consistently 
enforced those laws. 66 Factors inhibiting enforcement include limited 
staff allocation, limits on. communication between the enforcement 
agency and other agencies that may have information useful to the 
enforcing agency, and constraints on investigative techniques. 67 An en-
forced employer sanction program imposes high civil rights and privacy 
costs on illegal aliens and legal workers alike without solving the underly-
ing problem of the presence of large numbers of illegal aliens. 
E. Retain the Status Quo 
Retaining the status quo, failing to escalate responses to the illegal 
alien problem, presents a finat alternative. 68 This alternative has the 
political attractiveness of not requiring a change in policy. It meets 
the needs currently served by illegal immigration: employers have ac-
cess to a pool of willing workers and aliens have access to work at 
United States wage levels. 
Ignoring the problem, however, fails to meet the needs of several 
interest groups. The United States inadequately enforces immigration 
and other laws. Aliens continue to enter or remain illegally, may be 
exploited by employers, and have limited access to social service pro-
64. Employers may use the threat of penalties to justify actions which constitute discrimina-
tion against members of ethnic groups associated with high levels of illegal aliens. Goodpaster, 
supra note 11, at 704; Comment, supra note 13, at 460. 
65. Employers may evade responsibility through subcontracting arrangements. Light penalties 
will become a cost of doing business. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION ON THE EN-
FORCEMENT OF LAWS REGARDING EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS IN SELECTED CoUNTRIES 2 (1982). En-
forcement requires employer cooperation. Scanlan, supra note 50, at 844. Many employers will, 
however, comply voluntarily. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 4, at 57. 
66. GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, supra note 65, at 2. The "knowing employment" require-
ment in the Canadian law led the enforcement agency to focus initial activities on educating 
employers. Id. at 3. Large German employers contracted with smaller exempt firms to provide 
workers. Id. 
67. 1d: at 2. 
68. Legislative inaction and the budget process tend to maintain the status quo. Keely, The 
Development of U.S. Immigration Policy Since 1965, 33 J. INT'L AFF. 249, 261 (1979). The 
status quo is always changing, however, because of the number of new immigrants each year. 
Gregory, supra note 20, at 289. 
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grams. Legal workers face continued competition from illegal aliens. 
Sending countries retain the option for their citizens to seek work in 
the United States and for remittances from those workers, but only 
at the cost of limited protection for those citizens. In light of the growing 
concern about the numbers of illegal aliens and their effects on United 
States society, this alternative becomes increasingly difficult to defend. 
III. DESIGNING A TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM: FROM CURRENT 
PROPOSALS TO A MODEL STATUTE 
Several proposals for temporary worker programs have been 
developed. These include proposals to (1) expand the existing H-2 pro- . 
gram, (2) provide interim temporary worker programs to help employers 
adjust to a smaller labor pool, and (3) implement temporary worker 
programs of indefinite duration. Unfortunately each of these various 
proposals leaves some significant problems unsolved. 
A. Expanded H-2 program 
One proposal advocates expansion of the current H-2 temporary 
worker program. 69 This small program currently provides approximately 
30,000 workers annually to a limited number of agricultural employers. 10 
An employer requests the Department of Labor to certify that qualified 
domestic workers are not "available and willing to work. " 11 Based on 
that certification, the INS provides visas for temporary workers, whom 
the employers may then recruit. 72 Dissatisfied employers may send 
workers home or reject specific workers, 73 giving workers a strong in-
centive to please employers. H-2 workers arrive without dependents, 74 
remain in the United States for relatively short periods of time, 75 and 
leave the United States at the conclusion of their work assignments. 76 
69. The Simpson-Mazzoli bill includes a proposal to expand the H~2 program. See SENATE 
STAFF REPORT, supra note I, at 44. 
70. D. NORTH, NONIMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE U.S.: CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE IM-
PLICATIONS 68 (1978); Migrant Legal Action Program, supra note 3. 
71. For descriptions of the Department of Labor certification procedure for H-2 workers, 
see Fraade & Arton, Temporary Employment of Foreign Nationals: The "H" Visa, 14 INT'L 
L. 235, 247 (1980); Furin, Immigration Law: Alien Employment Certification, 16 INT'L L. 111 
(1982); Manulkin & Maghame, supra note 14, at 51. 
72. The sending country is sometimes involved in recruitment of workers. D. NORTH, supra 
note 70, at 57. 
73. Employers may request H-2 workers by name, send workers home and receive replace-
ment workers, and "blacklist" a worker, preventing that worker from ever entering the United 
States on another H-2 nonimmigrant visa. Id. at 57-58. 
74. Migrant Legal Action Program, supra note 3, at 48. 
75. H-2 agricultural workers receive visas for a few weeks to a few months. D. NORTH, supra 
note 70, at 57. 
76. H-2 workers do not overstay their visas to join the pool of illegal aliens in the United 
States. Reubens, supra note 6, at 118. 
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The federal government excuses employers from withholding social 
security and federal income taxes and from contributing to social security 
taxes, 11 but employers still must pay a minimum wage and provide 
working conditions approved by the Department of Labor. 78 
Nonetheless, the right of employers to send workers home for unsatisfac-
tory conduct severely limits the ability of H-2 workers to organize for 
collective action, a right that the National Labor Relations Act grants 
to all workers. 79 
An expanded H-2-program would provide some benefits. It would 
enable the United States to distribute wealth to less developed coun-
tries by employing workers from those countries. Employers would 
have ·continuing access to needed workers, though accompanied by the 
costs and delays associated with Department of Labor certification of 
worker need. Foreign workers would have the opportunity to earn 
United States wages and sending countries would have the option of 
United States employment for their surplus workers. 
Without greater protection of the rights of H-2 workers, however, 
the wealth distribution resulting from such an expanded program would 
occur at the expense of creating a larger group of second-class workers. 
As employers sought the lower labor costs accruing from employment 
of H-2 workers, they might systematically exclude United States 
workers from some forms of eqiployment. H-2 workers would not en-
joy many of the rights accorded United States workers and would not 
acquire any greater opportunity to immigrate to the United States. Send-
ing countries would have some, but limited, control over the rights 
accorded their citizens working in the H-2 program. 
Expansion of the H-2 program would aggravate a number of prob-
lems. An employer paying equal wages to H-2 and United States workers 
saves at least nine percent of labor costs for H-2 workers by the ex-
emption of employer contributions to social security taxes. 80 This in 
effect confers a bonus upon employers for hiring foreign workers. In-
deed, under the present H-2 program, some employers may refuse to 
hire United States workers while awaiting Department of Labor cer-
tification of the unavailability of United States workers. 81 Further, 
because the continued employment of H-2 workers depends on employer 
satisfaction with all aspects of their behavior, employers may exten-
77. D. NORTH, supra note 70, at 59; Migrant Legal Action Program, supra note 3, at 43. 
78. The Department of Labor establishes adverse wage rates, based on prevailing wages. 
Employers must offer H-2 workers those wages and working conditions. Fraade & Arton, supra 
note 71, at 250; Migrant Legal Action Program, supra note 3, at 44. 
79. See National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976); Migrant Legal Action 
Program, supra note 3, at 42-43. 
80. D. NORTH, supra note 70, at 59. Martin & Houstoun, supra note 17, at 324 (estimating 
that employers save 25% to 35% of wage payments). 
81. Migrant Legal Action Program, supra note 3, at 51. 
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sively exploit such workers through inadequate recording of working 
time, overcharging for inadequate housing and meals, and witholding 
of wages earned. 82 Finally, an extended H-2 program would increase 
administrative costs in determining the unavailability of United States 
workers. 83 
The administrative problems and the potential for worker exploita-
tion involved in an expanded H-2 program render it an undesirable 
alternative. Consequently, the model temporary ,worker program pro-
posed in this Note does not incorporate an expansion of the H-2 pro-
gram. Further the model program does not exempt employers from 
payment of social security and other taxes, restrict workers to single 
employers, or involve the Department of Labor in certifying the short-
age of workers for specific jobs. · 
B. Interim Temporary Worker Programs 
Interim temporary worker programs, designed to exist for only a few 
years, 84 serve two purposes. First, interim programs provide an alter-
native to forced repatriation for aliens ·ineligible for amnesty because 
of, time limits or because of failure to meet a continuous residence 
requirement. 85 Second, such program'.s provide an adjustment period 
for enterprises now dependent on an illegal alien work force. 86 
An interim temporary worker program, however, is a poor comple-
ment to amnesty. The program may not provide a sufficiently strong 
incentive to encourage illegal aliens to apply for amnesty. Aliens ap-
plying for amnesty will no doubt consider the government's response 
to those applicants who do not meet the eligibility requirements. An 
ineligible illegal alien may face only the alternatives of deportation or 
participation in a temporary worker program. Illegal aliens who want 
to immigrate will have little incentive to risk identifying themselves 
to the federal government to determine their eligibility for amnesty. 
The alternative of temporary work in the United States offers an in-
centive only to those illegal aliens who wish to remain in the United 
States for temporary work purposes. 87 
82. D. NORTH, supra note 70, at 86. 
83. Migrant Legal Action Program, supra note 3, at 19 (describing costs of Department of 
Labor certification); see also Rodino, The Impact of Immigration on the American Labor Market, 
27 RUTGERS L. REv. 245 (1974) (describing the labor certification program). 
84. See, e.g., Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 349 (recommending five years). 
85. Cook, supra note 19, at 338; Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 348. 
86. Goodpaster, supra note II, at 718 (describing the need for interim provisions for employers 
currently dependent on illegal alien workers). 
87. Cornelius, Legalizing the Flow of Temporary Migrant Workers from Mexico: A Pro-
posal, in STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, app. F, at 307, 309. Some proposals do include the right 
to adjust to permanent resident status as an incentive for aliens interested in permanent settle-
ment in the United States. Id. at 313. 
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Interim programs cause numerous other difficulties. They do not 
allow the United States to distribute a portion of its wealth by pur-
chasing labor from other countries, or provide a continuing supply 
of labor. 88 In addition, they do not enable aliens to enter the United 
States labor market in future years. 
In order to avoid these difficulties, this Note prop·oses a model pro-
gram of indefinite duration, providing continuous alien access to the 
United States labor market. 
C. A- Temporary Worker Program of Indefinite Duration: 
Structuring A Model Program From the Proposed Programs 
Proposed temporary worker programs of indefinite duration repre-
sent a range of possible program structures. 89 The model program pro-
posed in this Note, designed to meet the needs of the interest groups, 
combines the strong features of the several proposed temporary worker 
programs. A number of differing features in these programs must be 
considered to determine which program can best serve aliens and send-
ing countries, while advancing the interest of the United States, its labor 
force and private employers. 
I. Freedom of job movement- The freedom of temporary workers 
to change jobs largely defin~s the rights and liberties of those workers. 
Nonetheless, most temporary worker programs allow little freedom of 
job movement. 90 One proposed program would restrict temporary 
workers to sectors of the economy that would otherwise experience 
worker shortages.91 Another proposal recommends the issuance of visas 
to workers with specific contracts in the United States. 92 Other pro-
posals provide temporary workers more complete freedom of job 
movement. 
The model program proposed in this Note, recognizing the relation-
ship between freedom to change jobs and other worker rights, places 
no restrictions on worker access to jobs. This decision prevents the 
88. Interim proposals limit future entry of workers. Yet some experts predict a United States· 
shortage of low-skilled workers. The extent to which enterprises currently dependent on illegal 
alien labor will' adjust by raising '\\'ages or investing in less labor-intensive production methods, 
rather than closing or moving to countries offering less costly labor, remains subject to debate. 
Interim programs rest, however, on the assumption that enterprises w,ill remain in the. United 
States and will hire more domestic workers. 
89. See, e.g., Cornelius, supra note 87; Gregory, supra note 20; Mines, A Temporary Work 
Permit Program for Mexicans (1979), in STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, app. F,: at 327. 
90. The restriction to specific employers encourages exploitation of H-2 workers. D. NORTH, 
supra note 70, at 57; Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 351; Briggs, supra note 17, at 154. 
91. Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 350-51 (recommending restriction of tem-
porary workers to sectors of the economy certified by the Department of Labor as needing workers). 
92. Gregory, supra note 20, at 303. 
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institutionalization of a second class of workers. It also eliminates the 
need to increase enforcement of worker protection legislation to pro-
tect temporary work visa holders from exploitation. 
2. Number of visas- If a temporary worker program seeks to 
preempt illegal migration for work, it must allow for a sufficient number 
of visas to meet the needs of United States employers for workers93 
and must provide potentially illegal entrants with the likelihood of legal 
admission. Long waits for receipt of temporary work visas will not 
draw potentially illegal entrants into the legal program. 
Several proposals recommend that the determination of the number 
of visas issued in any year would rest upon an assessment of the needs 
of United States employers. 94 Another proposal recommends that the 
needs of the sending country also be considered in determining the 
yearly number of temporary worker visas. 95 
The model temporary worker program proposed in this Note recom-
mends issuance of 500,000 temporary work visas during the first year, 
a number large enough to encompass the majority of estimated yearly 
illegal entrants. The model program also provides yearly adjustments 
in the numbers of visas issued, based on information collected by the 
Department of Labor about United States labor needs. Due to the in-
adequacy of current information, the model program includes a provi-
sion for the Department of Labor to develop a new data collection 
system. 
3. Visa time period- Temporary worker proposals specify the time 
period of each visa, ranging from six months96 to two years. 97 If the 
proposal anticipates that temporary workers will fill jobs that are tem-
porary or seasonal in nature, the time span provided should reflect 
that decision. 
Several conflicting policies influence the decision about the length 
of stay for each visa. Short stays provide a limited time for workers 
to locate jobs and recover travel costs, decreasing the potential savings 
workers can realize from each trip. Workers with a limited time to 
earn United States wages may prove more willing to accept unsafe work-
ing conditions in return for higher wages, undercutting efforts to im-
prove worker safety. 
On the other hand, longer stays result in more disruption of family 
relationships if visa holders may not bring their families. Longer stays 
93. The recommended numbers range from 50,000, see Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra 
note 17 at 350, to 750,000, see Cornelius, supra note 87, at 316. 
94. Cornelius, supra note 87, at 315; Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 351. 
95. Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 348. 
96. Cook, supra note 19, at 339. 
97. Mines, supra note 89, at 333. 
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also weaken ties with the home culture and increase the chance that 
the worker will develop expectations dependent on United States culture. 
The model program proposed 'in this Note incorporates a moderate 
alternative in which visas would remain valid for twelve months of 
work over a twenty-four month period. The twelve months do not have 
to be consecutive, providing flexibility for aliens who want to alter-
nate between working in the United States in seasonal agricultural jobs, 
and working in the home country during seasonal periods of limited 
United States agricultural employment. 
4. Adjustment of status- For aliens who want to immigrate to 
the United States, the opportunity to acquire an immigrant visa would 
off er a strong incentive to participate in a legal temporary worker pro-
gram rather than to enter the United States illegally. Some proposals 
include provisions allowing for the eventual adjustment of status to 
permanent resident alien after participation in the temporary worker 
program. 98 
The model program proposed in this Note also facilitates the desire 
of some aliens to immigrate. Aliens may renew their temporary work 
visas and may apply for adjustment of status to permanent resident 
alien after five years of participation in the temporary work program. 
5. Exit checking system- Many illegal aliens who initially entered 
the United States legally have overstayed the time allowed by their visa. 
To avoid a repetition of this pattern, a temporary worker program 
must insure that aliens entering on temporary worker visas leave at 
the expiration of those visas. 
The enforcement of exit requirements occurs more easily when 
workers are bonded to specific employers, as with the H-2 program. 
In light of the negative aspects of restricting workers to single employers, 
however, the solution embodied jn the H-2 program is inadequate. Alter-
native means of assuring timely departure _have been recommended. 
The implementation of a computerized record-keeping system for tern-: 
porary worker visas would aid in monitoring the exit of temporary 
workers. 99 Some proposals prohibit the issuance of another visa, for 
temporary work or permanent immigration, to aliens who fail to leave 
at the termination of their temporary visa period. 100 Other proposals 
incorporate stronger pressures to abide by the visas time limit. One 
proposal decreases the ·number of new visas available to a sending coun-
try for each visa that has not been turned in at expiration. 101 Another 
98. See Cook, supra note 19, at 340; Cornelius, supra note ·87, at 313; Gregory, supra note 
20, at 304; Mines, supra note 89. 
99. Cornelius, supra note 87, at 311. 
100. Id. at 311. 
IOI. See Reubens, supra note 6, at 123. 
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builds on the social structure of the aliens' sending community: when 
one temporary visa holder exits, turning in a visa, that visa would be 
issued to an individual whom the first visa holder nominated at the 
time of the initial visa application. An alien who knows that a relative 
or neighbor will receive a visa only after his return has a strong incen-
tive to turn in the temporary work visa and return home. 102 
The model program proposed in this Note, recognizing the role of 
social pressures and the potential contribution of the sending coun-
tries to encouragement of return migration, provides for a decrease 
in the number of new visas available to a sending country for those 
aliens who overstay their temporary work visa. The model program 
incorporates a computerized system for monitoring the entry and exit 
of temporary visa holders and prohibits the issuance of new visas to 
persons who have overstayed a temporary work visa. 
6. Admission of dependents- The admission of dependents of aliens 
raises numerous issues and concerns. First, dependents increase the 
numbers of individuals seeking access to social services, such as health 
care and education. 103 Second, workers whose family members move 
to the host country are less likely to return home. Third, aliens seek-
ing to accumulate money will save more by supporting dependents in 
the sending country than in the United States. Still, the psychological 
costs that individual workers and their families incur because of separa-
tion during periods of United States work are a consideration in favor 
of admission of family members. 
Current temporary worker proposals encompass a variety of alter-
natives, including prohibition of entry of family members, 10• admis-
sion of spouse on the worker's third temporary worker visa, 105 and 
open admission of family members. 106 
The model program proposed in this Note excludes family members, 
due -to the costs incurred in maintaining a family in the United States 
and the desire of many illegal aliens to remain only temporarily in 
the United States. Although the exclusion may impose some 
psychological costs on aliens seeking temporary work, the flexibility 
that the model program allows aliens - in the frequency of their en-
102. Mines recommends a system of revolving visas, where the second visa, upon receipt 
of the visa surrendered by the first temporary worker on his exit, is issued to an individual 
named by the first visa holder at the time of his application for a temporary work visa. Mines, 
supra note 89, at 334. 
103. For a discussion of the educational rights of children of illegal aliens, see Hull, Un-
documented Alien Children and Free Public Education: An Analysis of Plyler v. Doe [457 U.S. 
202 (1982)], 44 U. Pm. L. REv. 409 (1983). 
104. Cook, supra note 19, at 339. 
105. Gregory, supra note 20, at 304. 
106. Cornelius, supra note 87, at 313. 
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try and the duration of their stays - enables workers to return home 
as their earnings and savings goals permit. 
7. Rights in the workplace- The various temporary worker pro-
posals allow for the full enforcement of worker protection legislatioq, 
such as the minimum wage, to guard the interests of aliens. These pro-
posals typically grant aliens the right to join a union, 101 though some 
proposals restrict aliens from accepting jobs with employers involved 
in labor disputes. 108 
The model program proposed in this Note provides full rights to 
organize and bargain collectively. The fundamental policy decision that 
organization rights accrue to all workers requires extension of this right 
to temporary workers. By granting temporary workers the right to join 
unions, the model statute provides an incentive to unions to recruit 
temporary workers and to safeguard their right to enforcement of health 
and safety legislation. The grant of the right to join a union limits 
any incentive employers have to exploit alien workers. 
8. Social service programs- Many illegal aliens have taxes and 
charges for other services, such as health insurance, deducted from 
their pay. The majority of illegal aliens receive no benefit from these 
payments. Some services, such as workers' compensation, directly relate 
to the worker's participation in the work force. The value of other 
services, however, varies significantly. For example, the worker who 
cannot bring dependent children to the United States for the duration 
of the work permit period cannot use education services, but remains 
subject to the sales and property taxes that support such services. 109 
The temporary worker proposals require employers to withhold in-
come tax payments from wage payments and require employer and 
employee contributions to social service programs, such as social 
security. 110 Several proposals provide, however, for a return of these 
funds to the alien worker in the sending country. 111 
To avoid taking taxes as payments for services from which alien 
workers do not benefit, a temporary worker program must either allow 
access to those services or must refund payments to workers when they 
leave the United States. To avoid granting an undue advantage to tem-
porary foreign workers in the competition for United States jobs, 
however, the payments required of employers for temporary workers 
must equal those required for domestic workers. 
107. Cornelius, supra note 87, at 314; Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 355. 
108. Cornelius, supra note 87, at 314. 
109. For a discussion of tax payments by illegal aliens, see supra note 14. 
110. Mines, supra note 89, at 334 (recommending a flat 15 percent tax withheld from wages 
of temporary workers); Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note' 17, at 354 (recommending that 
employers and employees contribute to social service program taxes). 
111. Mines, supra note 89, at 334; Sinkin, Weintraub & Ross, supra note 17, at 355. 
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The model program proposed in this Note provides for payment of 
employer and employee taxes and for normal contributions to social 
programs. The local government continues to impose taxes, since the 
alien receives police and fire protection. The extensive administrative 
costs involved in exempting the alien from initial payment of the local 
tax, or in refunding any of the payments, preclude those alternatives. 
Those costs do not apply to payroll withholding taxes and employer 
contributions to federal social programs, and consequently those funds 
are returned to the worker in the home country. The alien must return 
his expired temporary work visa to obtain the refund payment. This 
provision equalizes employer labor costs, does not charge the alien for 
services from which the alien receives no benefit, insures the alien of 
accumulated savings at the conclusion of the work period, and pro-
vides an incentive for the alien to return to the home country to col-
lect his savings. 
D. Those Affected by Temporary Worker Programs 
Temporary worker programs meet several of the needs of the in-
terested groups - society, employers, aliens, workers, and sending coun-
tries. Proponents argue that temporary worker programs would enable 
the United States to enforce its immigration and worker protection 
laws while meeting the need for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. 
Temporary worker programs would also enable the United States to 
distribute a portion of its wealth to less developed countries by pur-
chasing surplus labor from those countries. 
Employers would have continued access to a large labor pool. By grant-
ing job mobility to temporary workers, the program would avoid the costs 
incurred by employers and the government in certifying labor shortages. 
Aliens would acquire an opportunity to earn United States wages free 
from fear of deportation. The temporary workers would enjoy the rights, 
protections, wages, and working conditions accorded domestic workers. 
Aliens holding temporary work visas would have restricted rights 
to social services, but would receive notice of those limitations before 
applying to enter the program. Aliens would gain the opportunity to 
immigrate. A temporary worker program would protect legal workers 
from unfair competition by illegal aliens willing to accept substandard 
wages and working conditions. 
Sending countries would retain the benefits of immigration. They 
would receive relief from pressures resulting from unemployment and 
underemployment and would pass income to poorer portions of the 
population through temporary worker remittances. In addition, they 
would have a greater guarantee of the protection of the rights of their 
citizens while they work in the United States. 
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Temporary worker programs do not, however, meet all the needs 
of all interest groups. Aliens participating in a temporary worker pro-
gram would face some restrictions on their work, such as length of 
time in the United States, access to social services, and entry of family 
members. Domestic workers would face competition from temporary 
workers. Still, although that competition might retard wage increases, 
it might also retard conversion to labor-saving production methods 
which result in an overall loss of jobs. Moreover, the temporary workers, 
freed from the fear of deportation, would not depress wages and work~ 
ing conditions by accepting work under exploitive conditions. Finally, 
sending countries would continue to experience the loss of enterprising 
workers and would encounter rising expectations among returning 
workers and their dependents. 
Despite these drawbacks, a temporary worker program of indefinite 
duration presents the best resolution of the competing interests and 
values. Conflicting economic arguments about the positive and negative 
effects of large numbers of illegal workers on the economy do not 
support a major change in the numbers of available workers by elimina-
tion of illegal aliens from the work force. A carefully designed tem-
porary worker program provides for a continued supply of workers 
while protecting the interests of United States society, employers, 
domestic workers, the aliens themselves, and sending countries. 
IV. MODEL TEMPORARY WORK PROGRAM 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND POLICY 
Finding that public policy requires a response to the growing number 
of illegal aliens;· 
that stricter enforcement of immigration laws serves the public interest; 
that the United States benefits from immigration; 
that the economy requires a continued supply of unskilled and semi-
skilled workers which current population patterns will not provide; 
that provision of opportunities for citizens of less developed coun-
tries to sell their labor at high United States wages benefits those workers 
and improves diplomatic relations with less developed countries; 
that the present immigration system provides limited opportunity for 
aliens without family members in the United States to immigrate; 
that aliens working illegally in the United States are subject to 
exploitation; 
that workers who, because of a fear of deportation, accept wages 
and working conditions below the minimum statutory levels subject 
legal workers to unfair competition; 
and that countries whose citizens become illegal aliens in the United 
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States have an interest in continued access to United States labor markets 
for their citizens and in protection of the rights of those citizens while 
working in the United States; 
this legislation amends the Immigration and Nationality Act by pro-
viding for a continuing program of admission of temporary workers. 
This amendment is intended to operate in conjunction with a pro-
gram of sanctions for employers who hire aliens not authorized to work 
in the United States and an amnesty authorizing adjustment to perma-
nent resident alien status for illegal aliens in continuous residence in 
the United States for the requisite number of years. 
SECTION 1: DEFINITIONS 
For the purposes of the Act, the following words and phrases shall, 
unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, have the meanings ascribed 
to them in this section: 
(a) "Temporary worker" means a person within the United States 
on a visa issued pursuant to this Act, authorizing the individual 
to seek and hold employment during the time period specified 
in the visa document. 
(b) "Adjustment of status" means adjustment to permanent resi-
dent alien status, with all rights associated with that status, in-
cluding the right to petition for admission of immediate relatives 
and the right to apply for citizenship. 
(c) "Visa abuse" means violation of terms of a visa by remaining 
in the United States illegally at the expiration of the time period 
for which a visa was issued, or working while holding a visa 
that does not authorize the visa bolder to work in the United 
States. 
(d) "Temporary work visa" is a visa authorizing the holder to reside 
in the United States for a total of twelve months, not necessarily 
consecutive, during the twenty-four months for which the visa 
is valid and to hold any job except jobs vacant due to a labor 
dispute. 
(e) "Rule making procedures" refer to relevant portions of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, Public Law 404-79th Congress, as 
amended. 
SECTION 2: INITIAL ISSUANCE OF VISAS 
In the first year of this program, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service may issue a maximum of 500,000 temporary work visas under 
this program. Aliens who do not meet the amnesty requirements may 
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apply for temporary work visas. During the first year, visas will be 
issued within the United States, upon application, to aliens present in 
the United States at the time of passage of this legislation. In the second 
and subsequent years, visas will be issued in sending countries through 
normal visa-issuing channels. 
Comment 
The temporary worker program is intended to fill employers' labor 
needs, while limiting the opportunity for undocumented aliens to work. 
The program must consequently provide a number of visas roughly 
equivalent to the number of new illegal alien worker entrants each year. 
A figure of 500,000 visas complies with estimates from several sources. 
Limiting first year visas to aliens currently in the United States without 
documentation provides an alternative to deportation for persons in-
eligible for the amnesty program. The restriction to aliens in the United 
States at the time of passage of the legislation should serve to prevent 
an influx of aliens seeking immediate access to temporary work visas. 
SECTION 3: RENEW AL OF VISAS 
At the conclusion of a twenty-four month period, aliens may apply 
for another temporary work visa. Individual aliens will be eligible for 
a temporary work visa only once in each twenty-four month period. 
The alien may apply at the United States consulate in the sending country 
or, if the alien is in the United States prior to the expiration of one 
visa, at a regional office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
Comment 
This provision seeks to enable aliens without specialized skills or 
family members in the United States to acquire an immigrant visa. 
The number of years of temporary work required for adjustment to 
permanent resident alien status (see Section 7) necessitates receipt of 
multiple temporary work visas. 
The restrictions on the frequency with which individual aliens can 
obtain visas serves two purposes. First, the restriction distributes 
available visas- among applicants within a sending country. Second, 
the restriction encourages aliens who have spent a period of time working 
in the United States to renew work and social ties to their home 
community. 
. SECTION 4: NUMBER OF TEMPORARY VISAS 
In the first year and each year thereafter, the Attorney General, after 
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consultation with the Secretaries of Labor, Agriculture, and State, will 
establish a maximum number of temporary work visas to be issued 
during the following twelve_ month period. The Attorney General shall 
consider the supply of labor available in the United States, the desires 
of the governments of countries from which individuals have sought 
temporary work visas, and recommendations from the several 
Secretaries. This list does not exhaust the factors the Attorney General 
may consider. 
Comment 
The temporary work program serves the need for workers that the 
supply of domestic workers does not and probably will not meet. It 
serves neither as a temporary response to stricter enforcement of the 
immigration laws nor as an interim solution to the status of illegal 
aliens ineligible for adjustment of status to permanent resident alien. 
The program directs the Attorney General to establish, through formal 
rule making procedures in accordance with the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, the methods and criteria relevant in establishing the number 
of visas to be issued. The Attorney General retains the discretion, 
however, to make the final determination of the number of visas. 
SECTION 5: AUTHORIZATION UNDER THE VISA 
The temporary work visa authorizes the holder to enter the country 
for a total period of twelve months during the twenty-four months 
for which the visa is valid. The temporary work visa holder may search 
for and hold any job, except that the temporary work visa holder may 
not replace workers engaged in a labor dispute. The Secretary of Labor 
shall establish, through rule making procedures, regulations for enforc-
ing this exemption. 
Comment 
The twelve month time period serves as a compromise between com-
peting interests. The workers would favor more time in the United 
States, because that would offer greater job opportunities and would 
enable them to achieve a higher return for their investment of time 
and trouble in obtaining a temporary work visa. Labor unions seeking 
to organize these workers would also desire longer work periods dur-
ing which temporary work visa holders could participate in union 
activities. Employers would also want to retain workers once they have 
been trained. All of these interests argue for a longer period of work 
for each visa holder. 
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Various factors, however, militate toward a shorter time period. The 
exclusion of family members, discussed in the comment to section 9, 
would dissuade many workers from remaining for an extended period. 
A shorter stay would also result in less assimilation to the United States 
and therefore in less desire to immigrate. 
The program rejects restrictions on temporary work visa holders' 
job freedom. They may compete with domestic workers for jobs. Still, 
the rights of domestic workers to strike for better wages and working 
conditions, and to protest alleged unfair labor practices, deserve pro-
tection. This provision prohibits temporary workers, whose desire to 
earn relatively high United States wages during their twelve months 
of eligiblity may encourage them to take any job, from seeking employ-
ment in jobs vacant because of labor disputes. 
SECTION 6: ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS 
(a) Aliens who have worked a total of sixty months in the United 
States will be eligible, upon application, for adjustment of status 
to permanent resident alien. Application for a refund of tax 
money in accordance with the provisions of section 8 does not 
preclude later application for adjustment of status. 
(b) Once status has been adjusted in accordance with (a), these aliens 
shall have all rights accorded to any permanent resident aliens. 
Visa numbers for such aliens shall count against the total number 
for the sending country in the year in which any alien receives 
such adjustment of status. 
Comment 
This provision offers a legal alternative to those persons who desire 
to immigrate, thereby lessening the pressure on those aliens to overstay 
their temporary work visa period. It also provides an immigration op-
portunity to aliens with limited skills and no family ties in the United 
States. 
SECTION 7: RETURN OF TEMPORARY VISAS 
PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF NEW VISAS 
The total number of visas available to any country in any year will 
be decreased by the number of expired temporary work visas issued 
to citizens of that country which have not been returned to the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service or a United States consular office. 
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Comment 
This provision enlists the interests of the sending countries in en-
couraging their citizens holding temporary work visas to comply with 
visa time limits. This provision also imposes a ceiling on the total number 
of temporary workers from any one country. The total number of 
workers with valid and expired visas will be equal to or smaller than 
the number of visas allocated to that country. 
SECTION 8: PENALTIES FOR VISA ABUSE 
(a) Any worker found guilty of overstaying his or her temporary 
work visa will not be eligible for adjustment of status to perma-
nent resident alien, receipt of an immigrant visa, or receipt of 
another temporary work visa. 
(b) The Attorney General shall develop and implement a system for 
documenting the entry and exit of aliens holding temporary work 
visas. 
(c) The Attorney General shall have the power to waive this penalty 
in the event that circumstances warrant, in accordance with regula-
tions the Attorney General shall develop under AP A rule mak-
ing procedures. 
Comment 
This section requires the implementation of a comprehensive system 
to document the entry and exit of aliens under temporary work visas. 
Modern information processing capabilities should enable the Attorney 
General to develop and implement such a system. 
The Attorney General holds the discretionary authority to waive the 
restriction of this section in individual cases. This provision expressly 
grants this authority to enable the Attorney General to modify the poten-
tially harsh effects of this section of the statute. 
SECTION 9: DEPENDENTS EXCLUDED 
Aliens may not bring or send for spouses or dependents during their 
stay on a temporary work visa. 
Comment 
Because the temporary work visa holder remains in the United States 
for a relatively short period of time, the hardships involved in separa-
tion from family members are of similarly short duration. This provi-
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sion also encourages the visa holder to return home at the end of the 
visa period. Finally, this provision limits costs that local and state 
governments might incur as a result of the temporary worker program. 
SECTION 10: TAXES AND OTHER PAYMENTS 
(a) Employers of aliens holding temporary work visas shall be respon-
sible for normal payments and withholdings required for worker's 
compensation; social security; and federal, state, and local in-
come taxes. 
(b) Aliens shall file federal income tax returns. The consular office 
shall so inform workers when they apply for a temporary worker 
visa and shall provide assistance in the filing of such tax returns. 
The Internal Revenue Service shall assist temporary visa holders 
in the filing of United States tax returns. 
(c) Aliens earning income in the United States in any tax year under 
a temporary work visa who file a federal income tax return for 
that year will receive a tax refund from the federal government. 
The Attorney General shall yearly establish the amount of the 
refund in consultation with the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development and the Secretary of Education. This refund shall 
cover the costs of services for which the temporary worker visa 
holder is not eligible while in the United States. 
(d) Temporary work visa holders may, upon return to their home 
country and surrender of their visa, secure their contributions 
to the social security system. Temporary visa holders who elect 
not to remove their contributions may participate in the United 
States social security retirement system. 
Comment 
This section eliminates the bonus accorded employers of H-2 workers, 
raising the cost to employers of hiring aliens holding temporary work 
visas to the level of the costs for hiring other workers. This section 
thus equalizes the rights of foreign and domestic workers to retire-
ment and worker's compensation. 
Aliens on temporary work visas are excluded from access to some 
public services, such as unemployment compensation and education 
for their children. To balance this limitation on worker rights, the federal 
government will reimburse all aliens working in the United States under 
a temporary work visa. The amount of this refund will be determined 
by the Attorney General, in cooperation with the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development and the Department of Education. The 
Attorney General will consider, among other factors, the average school 
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tax rate in the United States, and the cost of governmental services 
for which temporary work visa holders are not eligible, such as welfare 
and unemployment compensation. 
SECTION 11: JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Decisions about the status of temporary work visa holders and adjust-
ment of status are reviewable. Review may occur in the federal district 
court for the region where (1) the decision ·appealed from occurred, 
(2) the alien is employed or resides, or (3) the District of Columbia. 
Comment 
This provision for judicial review of immigration decisions is con-
sistent with, and is not intended to expand, current provisions in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. 
Marjorie E. Powell 
